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Abstract	
This	research	is	a	qualitative	analysis	of	the	role	of	accounting	in	British	disablement	pensions	awarded	to	men	
who	sustained	shell	shock	during	their	Army	service	in	the	First	World	War.		It	suggests	that	accounting	
classification	of	shell	shock	for	pension	determination	purposes	supported	a	view	of	shell	shock	which	made	
men	with	shell	shock	scapegoats	of	a	system	that	was	often	unsupportive.		Accounting	classification	
contributed	to	the	lack	of	support	by	distancing	pension	decision-makers	from	the	moral	consequences	of	
pension	determinations.		This	was	able	to	occur	because	the	British	government	used	accounting	classification	
as	part	of	a	mechanism	to	avoid	blame	for	its	pension	determination	choices.		This	research	contributes	to	an	
ongoing	debate	about	the	role	of	government	by	suggesting	that	the	functions	of	government	provide	
opportunities	for	accounting	to	simultaneously	serve	a	neutral	role	as	mere	inscription	while	being	a	social	and	
moral	construct.	
Keywords	
Accounting	history,	blaming,	distancing,	First	World	War,	pensions,	scapegoating.	
Introduction	
Who	are	these?	Why	sit	they	here	in	twilight?	
Wherefore	rock	they,	purgatorial	shadows	…	
Treading	blood	from	lungs	that	had	loved	laughter.	
Always	they	must	see	these	things	and	hear	them,	
Batter	of	guns	and	shatter	of	flying	muscles,	
Carnage	incomparable,	and	human	squander	
Rucked	too	thick	for	these	men’s	extrication
1
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In	the	1990s,	Tinker	and	Solomons	debated	whether	accounting	was	a	neutral,	fair	and	just	means	of	
representing	reality.		Solomons	viewed		accounting	as	a	neutral	and	unbiased	technology	(Solomons,	1991a;	
Solomons,	1991b)	whereas	Tinker	asserted	it	is	an	artificial	construct	that	can	never	be	neutral	(Tinker,	1991;	
Tinker	and	Ghicas,	1993).		McSweeney	(1997)	offered	a	compromise	view	of	neutrality	as	a	goal	to	which	
accounting	should	aspire.		The	inability	of	accounting	to	achieve	neutrality,	assuming	it	is	both	possible	and	
desirable,	has	been	attributed	to	factors	including	the	politicisation	of	accounting	(McKernan,	2007),	the	
narrow	view	taken	by	accounting	standard	setters	of	accounting’s	role	in	democratic	society	(Bayou	et	al.,	
2011),	limitations	of	the	epistemological	boundaries	in	accounting	(Mouck,	2004),	ideological	manifestations	
of	accounting	(Dillard,	1991)	and	philosophical	assumptions	of	accounting	(McKernan,	2007).		Although	the	
technical	and	neutral	view	of	accounting	espoused	by	Solomons	(1991a;	Solomons,	1991b)	pertained	
specifically	to	accounting	standard	setting,	the	construction	of	accounting	as	morally	neutral	inscription	has	
been	extended	to	accounting	practice	(Robson,	1992).		The	neutrality	of	accounting	is	opposed	by	those	who	
view	accounting	as	a	social	construct	(Hopwood,	1987)	and	moral	discourse	(Williams,	2002),	rejecting	claims	
of	accounting	neutrality	as	mythic	and	a	failure	to	recognise	the	interpretive	and	metaphorical	nature	of	
accounting	(Morgan,	1988)	which	through	its	reporting	choices	can	create	reality	(Hines,	1988),	albeit	in	often	
one-sided	ways.		The	purpose	of	our	research	is	to	suggest	that	there	may	be	a	point	of	intersection	in	
government	accounting	where	accounting	as	a	technical	inscription	and	accounting	as	a	social	construct	co-
exist	because	of	the	flexibility	and	adaptability	of	accounting.			
We	illustrate	this	by	examining	accounting	processes	that	supported	disablement	pensions	paid	to	British	
Army	soldiers	who	suffered	shell	shock	as	a	result	of	front-line	service	in	the	British	Army	during	the	First	
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World	War.		The	First	World	War	was	the	first	time	the	term	“shell	shock”	was	used	although	symptoms	
consistent	with	shell	shock	have	been	identified	since	ancient	times	(Babington,	1997).		The	term	describes	a	
set	of	symptoms	which	can	include	loss	of	hearing,	speech,	sight,	movement	control	or	cognitive	abilities,	an	
appearance	of	concussion	without	a	head	trauma	injury,	or	fear	ranging	from	a	desire	to	flee	the	battle	area	to	
a	catatonic	state.		During	the	First	World	War,	desire	to	flee	a	battle	area	was	a	particularly	contentious	
symptom	which	led	the	British	Army	to	contend	shell	shock	was	cowardice	rather	than	a	real	medical	condition	
(Head,	1916)	with	the	potential	penalty	of	execution	rather	than	medical	treatment	(British	Expeditionary	
Force,	1922).		In	medical	diagnosis,	the	term	“shell	shock”	was	not	exclusively	used.		Other	terms	commonly	
used	included	nervous	disorder,	neurasthenia,	commotion,	hysteria,	weak	heart,	nervous	disorder	of	the	heart	
and	insanity	(Babington,	1997)		We	have	used	the	term	“shell	shock”	because	it	was	both	used	in	medical	
diagnosis	and	common	parlance	during	the	period	covered	by	our	research.		Although	our	historical	example	is	
limited	by	time	and	context,		issues	of	equitable	pension	determinations	for	those	disabled	by	war	and	how	to	
manage	pension	entitlements	for	those	suffering	from	battle	trauma	that	may	not	manifest	in	clearly	definable	
symptoms	are	contemporary	ones	that	remain	contentious	(Forbes	et	al.,	2001;	McDonald	and	Calhoun,	2010).			
We	adopt	an	historical	example	purposely	so	the	accounting	issues	are	highlighted	without	the	politicisation	or	
emotion	that	is	connected	to	contemporary	discussion	of	post-traumatic	stress	disorder	(Wessely	and	Deahl,	
2003;	Stubbs	and	Soroya,	1996;	Bichescu	et	al.,	2007),	which	is	the	contemporary	equivalent	of	shell	shock.	
Our	research	covers	the	war	years	of	1914	to	1918	and	immediate	post-war	period	when	Britain’s	pension	
obligation	to	disabled	war	veterans	peaked.		This	period	was	one	of	major	cultural	change	in	Britain	(Eksteins,	
2000)	and	a	time	of	change	for	accounting	processes	in	response	to	efforts	to	introduce	scientific	approaches	
to	cost	calculation	(Boyns	and	Edwards,	2006).		The	Institute	of	Cost	and	Management	Accountants	was	
established	during	this	period,	in	1919	(Loft,	1986).		During	the	period	covered	by	our	research,	the	British	
government	used	accounting	information	primarily	for	expenditure	control	(Funnell,	2006;	Miley	and	Read,	
2014)	but	actively	encouraged	its	private	sector	suppliers	to	implement	scientific	management	practices	that	
would	enable	them	to	use	accounting	information	for	costing	decisions	to	ensure	the	Government	was	not	
overcharged	for	resources	acquired	from	the	private	sector	for	the	war	effort	(Boyns	and	Edwards,	2006;	
Brown,	1998).	
Our	research	uses	primary	resources	when	available.		These	include official	transcripts	of	Parliamentary	
debates,	reports	by	the	Ministry	of	Pensions,	a	post-war	inquiry	by	the	War	Office	into	the	management	of	
shell	shock	(War	Office	Committee	of	Inquiry	into	Shell	Shock,	1922),	a	report	on	war	pensions	by	two	
members	who	served	on	the	Ministry	of	Pensions	Appeal	Tribunal	throughout	the	war	(Parry	and	Codrington,	
1918)	and	the	case	histories	of	British	Army	doctors	who	specialised	in	the	treatment	of	shell	shock	cases	
(Mott,	1919;	Rivers,	1918a;	Smith	and	Fear,	1917;	Myers,	1915;	Salmon,	1917).		Secondary	sources	referenced	
include	Britain’s	official	war	history,	or	provide	particular	specialised	knowledge	such	as	an	historical	study	of	
shell	shock	case	histories	by	psychiatrists	seeking	to	understand	contemporary	manifestations	of	this	condition	
through	historical	analysis	(Jones	et	al.,	2002).		We	recognise	that	men	who	had	front-line	battle	service	with	
the	British	Army	during	the	First	World	War	were	not	the	only	groups	to	suffer	from	mental	trauma.		We	also	
recognise	that	those	with	other	war	disabilities	were	also	disadvantaged	by	changes	to	the	pension	
entitlement	system	that	occurred	during	the	period	covered	by	our	research.		However	there	is	evidence	that	
the	disadvantage	to	men	with	shell	shock	exceeded	the	financial	disadvantage	to	other	people	receiving	war	
disability	pensions	(Parry	and	Codrington,	1918;	Ministry	of	Pensions,	1919;	Reid,	2010)	so	our	research	is	
limited	to	those	suffering	the	greatest	financial	disadvantage.	
The	next	section	provides	further	background	on	shell	shock	and	the	moral	dilemma	it	presented	to	the	British	
Government.		This	is	followed	by	a	description	of	Britain’s	disablement	pension	system	and	an	analysis	of	this	
illustrative	example	enhances	our	understanding	of	accounting.		Our	analysis	draws	on	extant	research	on	
blaming,	distancing	and	scapegoating	to	show	the	flexibility	of	accounting	as	a	mechanism	that	promotes	
neutrality	of	judgement	while	simultaneously	promoting	morally-laden	decision-making.		We	conclude	that	
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accounting	can	simultaneously	support	technical	neutrality	of	decision-making	that	distances	decision-makers	
from	the	morality	of	their	decisions	while	providing	a	morally-laden	decision	which,	in	this	case,	financially	
discriminated	against	men	with	shell	shock,	making	them	victims	for	a	second	time.		These	men	were	victims	
of	shell	shock	through	their	war	experiences	who	became	victims	of	a	discriminatory	pension	system.			
Background		
In	this	section,	we	introduce	factors	that	impacted	on	disablement	pensions	entitlements	for	men	with	shell	
shock.		First,	it	was	poorly	understood	as	a	medical	condition.		There	was	neither	an	accepted	definition	nor	
accepted	medical	protocol	for	diagnosis	and	treatment	(Webb,	2006)	which	led	to	considerable	doubt	about	
the	genuineness	of	those	claiming	battle	trauma.		Second,	the	lack	of	consistent	and	readily	determinable	
symptoms	that	could	always	be	described	as	shell	shock	contradicted	prevailing	medical	understanding	and	
confounded	pension	decision-makers.		The	image	of	the	shell-shocked	soldier	has	become	synonymous	with	
the	First	World	War	(MacLeod,	2004).		The	high	incidence	of	shell	shock	diagnoses	among	officers	and	enlisted	
men	in	the	British	Army	impacted	on	Britain’s	ability	to	maintain	an	adequate	fighting	force	during	the	war	and	
on	pension	and	medical	costs	both	during	and	after	cessation	of	hostilities	(Babington,	1997).		It	challenged	
British	notions	of	masculinity	and	had	significant	economic	implications	when	formerly	able-bodied	men	were	
unable	to	return	to	civilian	employment	following	their	war	service	and	sought	pension	entitlements	for	
disablement	that	did	not	include	a	physical	battle	wound	(Holden,	1998).		Britain	borrowed	heavily	to	finance	
participation	in	the	First	World	War	(Mitchell,	2011)	so	its	burgeoning	debt	problem	was	compounded	by	the	
financial	demand	from	the	large	number	of	pension	claims.		In	this	section,	we	also	address	the	uncertainty	
concerning	the	number	of	men	with	shell	shock	which	was	a	consequence	of	the	lack	of	medical	protocol	and	
imprecise	understanding	of	the	condition	but	which	means	that	it	is	not	possible	to	be	precise	about	the	
magnitude	of	the	pension	problem	described	in	this	research.		We	can	only	present	estimates	of	the	
magnitude	of	the	problem	so	although	we	refer	in	our	research	to	sources	such	as	Parliamentary	debate	
records	where	pensions	for	men	with	shell	shock	were	frequently	discussed,	quantitative	data	must	
necessarily	be	replaced	by	inferential	qualitative	data	in	this	area	of	research.	
An	issue	for	the	British	medical	profession	was	whether	shell	shock	could	exist	without	obvious	physiological	
injury	such	as	a	battle	wound.		When	first	identified	in	1914,	shell	shock	was	considered	a	physical	trauma	to	
colloidal	tissue	of	the	spinal	column	or	brain	caused	by	the	force	of	exploding	shells	from	heavy	ammunition,	
which	is	why	it	was	termed	“shell	shock”	(Myers,	1915).		However,	when	casualties	with	similar	symptoms	but	
who	had	not	been	near	exploding	shells	began	to	present	in	large	numbers,	doctors	sought	other	explanations	
and	antipathy	towards	a	diagnosis	of	shell	shock	commenced	(Smith	and	Fear,	1917).		Although	psychological	
battle	trauma	was	suggested,	physiological	explanations	for	shell	shock	prevailed.		This	reflected	medical	
knowledge	of	the	time,	the	British	medical	profession’s	distrust	of	psychiatric	methods	and	the	lack	of	
professional	recognition	by	the	British	medical	profession	for	psychiatry.		Psychological	illness,	the	diagnosis	
and	treatment	of	which	were	in	their	infancy,	was	maligned	in	Britain	in	the	nineteenth	century	when	the	
pejorative	term	“railway	spine”	became	popular	to	describe	people	who	claimed	spinal	pain	following	
involvement	in	a	railway	accident	when	there	was	no	sign	of	physical	illness.		Shell	shock	patients	were	often	
said	to	have	railway	spine.		It	was	only	following	successful	post-war	treatment	of	shell	shock	as	a	
psychological	illness	that	attitudes	in	Britain	gradually	towards	the	condition	and	psychiatry	improved	and	the	
medical	profession	started	to	review	its	attitude	towards	men	with	shell	shock	(Rivers,	1917;	Rivers,	1918a;	
Rivers,	1918b).			
Although	the	British	medical	profession	was	divided	on	whether	shell	shock	was	a	genuine	medical	condition,	
the	British	Army	did	not	accept	shell	shock	as	a	legitimate	condition.		The	British	Army’s	official	position	was	
that	shell	shock	symptoms	were	either	cowardice	or	the	exacerbation	of	a	pre-existing	nervous	disposition	
(War	Office	Committee	of	Inquiry	into	Shell	Shock,	1922).		It	did	not	consider	prior	histories	when	recruiting	
men,	except	in	cases	of	a	prior	hospitalisation	for	insanity	which	disqualified	a	man	from	Army	service.		The	
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Army	view	that	shell	shock	was	the	aggravation	of	a	pre-existing	condition	was	not	based	on	empirical	
evidence	(War	Office	Committee	of	Inquiry	into	Shell	Shock,	1922).		The	Army	contended	that	the	shorter	
recruit	training	period	necessitated	by	war	prevented	Army	officers	identifying	men	of	nervous	disposition	
who	that	in	normal	circumstances	would	not	get	through	the	recruit	training	process	and	meant	that	men	of	
nervous	disposition	were	being	sent	into	battle	(War	Office	Committee	of	Inquiry	into	Shell	Shock,	1922).		The	
Army’s	position	was	that	a	nervous	disposition	was	a	self-inflicted	phenomenon	for	which	a	man	should	not	
receive	sympathetic	treatment	or	other	men	would	be	encouraged	to	feign	similar	symptoms	to	avoid	fighting	
in	the	front	line	of	battle.		From	1916,	when	the	Army	forbade	use	of	the	term	“shell	shock”	as	a	medical	
diagnosis	(British	Expeditionary	Force,	1922),	it	becomes	difficult	to	determine	the	real	nature	of	a	man’s	
medical	condition.		Royal	Army	Medical	Corps	diagnoses	were	often	hastily	made	when	dealing	with	many	
men	wounded	after	a	battle	but	from	1916,	could	also	be	purposely	vague	in	cases	of	shell	shock	(van	Bergen,	
2009).		Diagnosis	might	state	a	debilitating	symptom,	such	as	blindness	or	deafness	(War	Office	Committee	of	
Inquiry	into	Shell	Shock,	1922)	or	be	intentionally	misleading.		For	instance,	medical	records	for	Craiglockhart,	
a	hospital	in	Scotland	exclusively	for	severe	shell	shock	cases,	show	conditions	ranging	from	migraine,	gas	
poisoning,	glycosuria,	a	compound	fracture	of	the	toe	and	haemorrhoids	in	the	Royal	Army	Medical	Corps	
admissions	records’	diagnoses	(Webb,	2006).		Since	British	Army	medical	records	on	discharge	were	prima	
facie	evidence	for	pension	determinations,	diagnostic	problems	carried	forward	into	inconsistency	for	pension	
determination	purposes	(Parry	and	Codrington,	1918).		Due	to	the	diagnostic	inconsistencies,	there	are	no	
reliable	records	of	the	number	of	men	with	shell	shock.	
The	medical	profession	and	the	British	Army’s	attitudes	towards	shell	shock	are	important	because	both	were	
connected	with	the	provision	of	information	upon	which	pension	entitlement	claims	were	assessed.		Also,	both	
the	medical	profession	and	the	Army	were	involved	directly	with	determining	pension	entitlement	awards.		
The	involvement	of	both	groups	is	discussed	in	the	following	section.		
The	number	of	men	with	shell	shock	seeking	medical	attention	or	pensions,	the	number	of	men	with	shell	
shock	awarded	pensions	and	the	level	of	pension	award	determinations	for	men	with	shell	shock	cannot	be	
determined	precisely	because	of	the	imprecision	of	medical	and	pension	record-keeping.		Although	available	
figures	are	therefore	estimates	and	can	be	contradictory	due	to	their	imprecision,	it	would	appear	that	many	
men	suffered	shell	shock	so	can	be	assumed	that	shell	shock	symptoms	provided	the	basis	for	many	pension	
entitlement	claims.		In	December	1914,	when	the	British	Army	was	using	inter	alia	the	term	“shell	shock”	to	
describe	battle	trauma	symptoms,	7	to	10	per	cent	of	British	officers	and	3	to	4	per	cent	of	non-officers	had	
been	diagnosed	shell	shock	(MacLeod,	2004).		By	1916	the	British	Army	banned	use	of	the	term	“shell	shock”	
to	describe	battle	trauma,	replacing	it	with	a	variety	of	other	terms	in	an	attempt	to	hide	the	magnitude	of	the	
problem	(War	Office	Committee	of	Inquiry	into	Shell	Shock,	1922;	Miley	and	Read,	2015)	yet	between	July	and	
December	1916	over	16,000	new	diagnoses	were	made	in	addition	to	an	unspecified	number	of	diagnoses	
described	in	other	ways	(MacLeod,	2004).		Symptoms	consistent	with	shell	shock	represented	approximately	
40	per	cent	of	battle	casualties	and	over	30	per	cent	of	cases	of	men	discharged	from	the	Army	during	that	
period	(Merksey,	1979).		Mott	(1919),	a	doctor	who	worked	exclusively	in	the	treatment	of	shell	shock	
casualties,	estimated	that	one	seventh	of	all	men	discharged	as	medically	unfit	from	the	Army	suffered	from	
shell	shock.		In	October	1917	Salmon	(1917),	a	doctor	working	exclusively	in	shell	shock	rehabilitation,	
determined	that	if	all	men	with	wounds	were	excluded,	shell	shock	accounted	for	one	third	of	the	men	
discharged	from	the	British	Army	and	that	between	80,000	to	100,000	men	suffered	shell	shock	symptoms	
severe	enough	to	require	discharge	and	ongoing	medical	treatment.			
Since	the	Ministry	of	Pensions	did	not	recognise	shell	shock	as	a	separate	medical	condition	for	disablement	
pension	awards,	pension	figures	pertaining	to	shell	shock	are	unavailable.		However,	Britain’s	official	war	
history	indicates	that	in	1921	65,000	men	received	pensions	for	symptoms	of	shell	shock	(Cruttwell,	1934;	
Johnson	and	Rows,	1923)	from	a	total	1.3	million	pensions	awarded	(Reid,	2010).		By	1939	the	Ministry	of	
Pensions	stated	that	more	than	120,000	men	were	receiving	pensions	from	shell	shock	although	contemporary	
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analysis	of	Ministry	of	Pensions’	documents	has	suggested	this	may	have	been	an	overstatement	(Jones	et	al.,	
2002).		Despite	uncertainty	concerning	the	statistics,	it	can	be	said	that	the	amount	paid	in	pension	
entitlements	to	men	suffering	from	shell	shock	was	not	insubstantial	which	caused	consternation	for	a	
government	attempting	to	manage	escalating	debt	by	decreased	fiscal	spending	(Mitchell,	2011)	and	led	to	
pension	entitlements	for	shell	shock	becoming	a	target	for	cost	cutting	(Parry	and	Codrington,	1918).		This	is	
discussed	in	the	following	section.	
Accounting	for	disablement	pensions	
Pension	classification	schemes	provided	a	way	of	measuring	war	disablement	and	the	ongoing	State	
recompense	to	which	those	injured	in	the	service	of	their	country	were	entitled.		This	makes	them	an	
accounting	record	(Ezzamel,	2009)	and	a	mechanism	of	accounting	for	disablement.		In	this	section	we	discuss	
the	changes	to	pension	classification	and	management	in	the	period	1914	to	1923	focusing	on	impacts	on	men	
with	shell	shock.		Prior	to	1914,	military	pensions	were	a	discretionary	grant	from	the	British	monarch	who	
devolved	responsibility	for	Army	pensions	to	the	Army	Council	for	whom	practical	pension	management	was	
handled	by	the	Central	Army	Pensions	Issue	Office	and	Chelsea	Hospital	Commissioners	(Parry	and	Codrington,	
1918).		Significant	for	pension	management	was	that	at	the	outbreak	of	the	First	World	War,	the	monarch	
handed	all	pension	control	to	the	British	Government	so	the	outbreak	of	hostilities	marked	the	first	time	that	
the	government	had	been	required	to	undertake	military	pension	management	or	consider	the	impact	of	
military	pensions	on	public	finance.		It	is	also	significant	that	when	military	pensions	were	a	discretionary	
Crown	grant,	the	overriding	consideration	was	to	ensure	soldiers	did	not	suffer	loss	of	their	former	living	
standard	due	to	disablement	and	accounting	records	were	specifically	to	demonstrate	that	pensions	were	
equitable	(Parry	and	Codrington,	1918).		In	this	section	we	describe	the	period	between	the	outbreak	of	war	
and	1923	as	four	distinct	periods	in	terms	of	the	approach	used	by	the	British	Government	to	disablement	
pensions.	
Period	1:	1914-August	1916		
This	period	was	marked	by	a	lack	of	policy	and	confusion	concerning	disablement	pension	management.		
When	pension	responsibility	was	given	to	the	British	Government,	it	did	not	have	a	process	for	pension	
determinations.		Responsibility	for	pensions	was	shared	by	the	Chancellor	of	the	Exchequer,	Secretary	of	War,	
Treasury,	Admiralty	(only	for	Navy	pensions),	War	Office	whose	delegation	was	exercised	by	the	Army	Council	
which	devolved	its	authority	to	the	Central	Army	Pensions	Issue	Office,	Chelsea	Hospital	Commissioners	and	
Royal	Patriotic	Fund	Corporation,	which	had	been	established	pre-war	to	receive	private	donations	given	to	
supplement	Royal	pension	grants.		Without	clear	lines	of	responsibility,	the	British	Government’s	response	was	
to	continue	payment	of	pensions	awarded	by	Crown	grant	but	not	make	any	new	pension	awards	(Parry	and	
Codrington,	1918).	
In	November	1914,	Opposition	politician	Hayes	Fisher	proposed	a	unified	pension	system,	arguing	that	men	
from	all	levels	of	society	were	foregoing	current	employment	to	fight	as	private	soldiers	so	should	know	they	
would	receive	ongoing	pension	entitlement	if	unable	to	resume	employment	through	wartime	disablement.		
This	proposal	was	rejected	by	the	British	Government	as	revolutionary	and	unnecessarily	drastic	(United	
Kingdom,	1914).		By	May	1915	it	became	evident	to	the	War	Office	that	to	encourage	large	numbers	of	men	to	
support	the	war	effort	by	leaving	civilian	employment	for	temporary	wartime	military	service,	the	British	
Government	must	provide	disablement	pension	entitlements	equivalent	to	civilian	workers’	compensation	
(Reid,	2010).		While	this	process	was	being	developed,	all	pension	payments	were	stopped,	creating	hardship	
for	many	veterans	and	their	families	(United	Kingdom,	1915:	,	cc2106-16).	
The	British	Government	gave	the	Royal	Patriotic	Fund	Corporation	statutory	responsibility	to	determine	the	
pension	scheme,	assisted	by	local	and	district	committees	to	be	established	in	each	borough.		Committee	
members	were	recompensed	for	administrative	expenses	from	private	donations	that	had	been	previously	
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received	by	the	Royal	Patriotic	Fund	Corporation	to	supplement	Crown	pension	payments	(Parry	and	
Codrington,	1918).		Donors	were	not	notified	that	their	donations	had	been	applied	to	this	purpose	and	there	
was	no	publicly	available	accounting	record	of	this	expenditure	(Parry	and	Codrington,	1918).		The	Royal	
Patriotic	Fund	Corporation	proposed	a	pension	of	25	shillings	per	week	for	total	disablement	and	the	
difference	between	the	pensioner’s	income	from	other	sources	and	25	shillings	per	week	for	partial	
disablement.	There	was	concern	that	the	pension	entitlement	might	be	insufficient,	requiring	local	
government	supplementation	(Parry	and	Codrington,	1918)		but	due	to	disagreement	among	the	local	
committees,	this	scheme	was	not	implemented	so	the	issue	of	a	sufficient	entitlement	was	not	resolved.	
Period	2:	1916	
This	period	was	marked	by	the	introduction	of	a	government	pension	scheme	applicable	to	all	men	disabled	
through	war	service.		In	September	1916,	politician	Hayes	Fisher’s	political	party	was	in	government	and	he	
introduced	a	standard	disablement	pension	scheme.		The	Ministry	of	Pensions	was	established	to	determine	
and	control	Army	pensions	(Ministry	of	Pensions,	1919).		To	allay	concerns	that	physically	unfit	men	would	
undertake	military	service	for	a	few	months,	be	discharged	as	unfit	and	be	awarded	a	pension	for	life,	the	
scheme	provided	that	disablement	caused	by	military	service	gave	a	pension	for	life	whereas	disablement	of	a	
pre-existing	condition	aggravated	by	military	service	gave	a	pension	until	a	Pension	Medical	Board	comprising	
three	doctors	determined	the	medical	condition	had	returned	to	its	pre-war	state.		This	distinction	between	
disablement	caused	by	or	aggravated	by	war	service	was	only	applied	to	pension	determinations	for	men	with	
shell	shock	(Ministry	of	Pensions,	1919:	152).		The	determination	was	made	following	medical	discharge	from	
the	Army	and	was	not	subject	to	regular	review.	
In	accordance	with	its	official	position,	the	British	Army	stated	in	discharge	records	that	shell	shock,	or	its	
variants	such	as	commotion	and	hysteria,	were	exacerbations	of	pre-existing	conditions.		Pension	
determinations	were	usually	based	on	British	Army	discharge	medical	records,	though	other	medical	evidence	
could	be	referenced	(Jones,	2007)	so	prejudice	in	the	British	medical	profession	against	shell	shock	as	a	
legitimate	medical	condition	plus	Army	records	stating	that	war	service	had	aggravated	a	pre-existing	
condition	meant	men	the	outcomes	of	pension	determinations	for	shell	shock	symptoms	were	predictable	and	
did	not	favour	the	claimant	(Parry	and	Codrington,	1918).		Evidence	from	the	Pensions	Appeals	Tribunal	
indicates	Pension	Medical	Boards	were	inconsistent	in	their	interpretation	of	Army	medical	records	for	men	
with	shell	shock	symptoms	and	in	their	pension	determinations	(Parry	and	Codrington,	1918).		There	was	an	
slow	and	costly	appeal	process	but	it	rarely	overturned	Pension	Medical	Board	decisions	(Parry	and	
Codrington,	1918).	
As	part	of	the	1916	pension	scheme,	the	Ministry	of	Pensions	established	a	system	based	on	assessed	level	of	
disability.		All	existing	pension	holders	were	re-assessed	and	re-classified,	receiving	100%,	75%,	50%,	25%	of	
0%	of	the	total	disablement	pension.		The	percentage	entitlement	was	determined	using	detailed	descriptors	
of	the	type	of	disablement	at	each	pension	payment	level.		This	scheme	led	to	significant	cost	savings	for	the	
British	Government	since	previously,	all	pensioners	had	received	a	full	pension	entitlement	for	life	(Jones	et	al.,	
2002).		The	Financial	Secretary	to	the	War	Office	expressed	concern	in	Parliament	that	because	pension	
reviews	were	based	on	case	notes	rather	than	new	medical	examinations,	men	with	shell	shock	might	be	
treated	too	generously		because	improvements	in	their	medical	condition	would	not	be	taken	into	account,	
even	though	the	review	lowered	or	terminated	most	pensions	and	none	was	raised	(Parry	and	Codrington,	
1918).		Termination	of	a	pension	made	a	man	ineligible	for	publicly	funded	medical	treatment	and	eligible	for	
re-enlistment	in	the	Army.		This	led	to	some	men	with	shell	shock	being	returned	to	front	line	fighting	(War	
Office	Committee	of	Inquiry	into	Shell	Shock,	1922).	
Only	men	in	receipt	of	full	pensions	were	entitled	to	medical	care	funded	at	public	expense.		Public	concern	
about	the	number	of	men	with	shell	shock	no	longer	eligible	for	publicly	funded	medical	care	and	with	
insufficient	means	to	afford	private	care	led	to	private	money-raising	campaigns	to	fund	free	private	hospitals	
	8	
	
for	men	with	shell	shock	decreasing	the	total	cost	of	public	health	care	as	the	number	of	men	treated	at	public	
expense	decreased,	providing	an	additional	cost	saving	to	government	(Holden,	1998)	but	shifting	part	of	the	
medical	cost	burden	to	the	private	sector.		However	it	improved	government	health	statistics	which	were	
based	on	the	number	of	public	patients	(Reid,	2010)	so	gave	the	impression	that	public	health	treatment	was	
curing	men	with	shell	shock.	
Period	3:	1917-18	
This	period	was	marked	by	express	attempts	to	cut	pensions	as	a	mechanism	for	government	cost	saving,	
which	caused	particular	disadvantage	to	men	with	shell	shock.		In	1917,	£40,000,000	pounds	was	spent	on	
disablement	pensions	(Ministry	of	Pensions,	1919;	Mitchell,	2011)	and	the	Minister	of	Pensions	announced	
changes	expressly	stated	as	controlling	escalating	disablement	pension	costs,	lessening	the	number	of	men	on	
pensions	and	making	more	men	eligible	for	recruitment	to	boost	the	Army	(Parry	and	Codrington,	1918).		All	
pensions	were	reviewed	using	a	new	scale	that	set	awards	at	increments	of	10	per	cent.		Hence	the	level	of	
disability	was	assessed	to	be	100%,	90%,	80%,	70%,	60%,	50%,	40%,	30%,	20%,	10%	or	0%.			
The	pension	classification	did	not	make	more	men	eligible	for	pensions.		Men	previously	determined	to	have	a	
disablement	of	less	than	25%	who	had	previously	been	refused	a	pension	were	not	eligible	to	reapply	under	
the	new	classifications.		The	new	classifications	applied	solely	to	men	in	receipt	of	a	pension	at	the	time	the	
rules	changed	or	who	applied	for	a	pension	for	the	first	time	when	the	new	rules	were	in	force	(Parry	and	
Codrington,	1918).		Those	found	to	have	less	than	10	per	cent	disablement	were	deemed	ineligible	for	a	
pension.		The	British	Government	stated	this	was	an	administrative	efficiency	and	cost	saving	to	prevent	men	
claiming	excessive	amounts	for	their	disablement,	even	though	claimants	had	no	part	in	their	own	pension	
determination	(Parry	and	Codrington,	1918).			
Many	pensions	for	shell	shock	were	lowered	following	review	or	revoked	(Ministry	of	Pensions,	1919).		The	
Ministry	of	Pensions	used	this	as	evidence	of	previous	pension	over-payment,	blaming	men	receiving	pensions	
for	this	rather	than	those	who	had	been	responsible	for	determining	the	pensions	(Minister	of	Pensions,	1917).	
At	the	same	time,	other	changes	were	introduced.		The	British	Government	attempted	to	defray	the	escalating	
cost	of	war	pensions	by	shifting	the	burden	back	onto	the	public.		The	Naval	and	Military	War	Pensions,	&c.	
(Administrative	Expenses)	Act	1917	c.	14	gave	the	Minister	of	Pensions	power	to	accept	and	administer	private	
donations	towards	war	pensions.		These	funds	were	outside	Parliament’s	legal	control,	making	the	Minister	a	
private	almoner.	They	were	not	kept	separate	from	government	money	and	no	publicly	available	accounting	
for	their	use	was	provided	(Parry	and	Codrington,	1918:	116).			
To	lower	the	cost	of	Pension	Medical	Boards,	board	membership	became	a	voluntary	position	boards	were	
established	in	any	regional	town	with	volunteers	to	staff	a	local	board	(Parry	and	Codrington,	1918).		
Previously,	the	only	measure	of	consistency	had	been	achieved	because	a	small	pool	of	doctors	staffed	a	
central	Pension	Medical	Board	but	the	plethora	of	decentralised	boards	operated	independently.		An	Army	
officer	with	a	casting	vote	chaired	all	pension	board	hearings,	supported	by	two	doctors.		This	was	problematic	
for	men	with	shell	shock	because	of	the	Army’s	stated	position	against	shell	shock.			
The	most	significant	change	was	to	review	the	descriptors	used	for	each	medical	condition	and	requiring	
Pension	Medical	Board	to	identify	a	man’s	most	debilitating	medical	condition	then	apply	the	level	of	pension	
entitlement	consistent	with	that	condition.		For	shell	shock,	where	symptoms	could	change	and	fluctuate	in	
severity	over	time,	this	approach	was	unsatisfactory	but	it	also	proved	disadvantageous	to	men	with	shell	
shock	because	the	new	descriptors	favoured	those	with	physical	injuries.		Under	the	scheme,	if	the	most	
debilitating	medical	condition	as	determined	by	a	Pension	Medical	Board	was	not	covered	by	the	descriptors,	a	
pension	entitlement	was	revoked	irrespective	of	other	symptoms	(Parry	and	Codrington,	1918).	
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Simultaneously,	the	Minister	of	Pensions	stated	that	all	pensions	for	shell	shock	would	be	reviewed	because	it	
was	neither	an	illness	nor	wound	but	a	psychological	condition	that	men	could	control	in	all	but	the	most	
severe	cases	(Babington,	1997).		By	1917,	this	contradicted	prevailing	medical	opinion	which	was	shifting	to	
recognise	shell	shock	as	a	legitimate	medical	condition	occasioned	by	battle	trauma,	although	the	extent	to	
which	it	was	physiological	or	psychological	remained	subject	to	dispute	(Mott,	1919).		However,	it	accorded	
with	the	Army’s	view	of	shell	shock	which	remained	antagonistic	(British	Expeditionary	Force,	1922).		The	
Minister	for	Pensions	stated	that	pensions	for	shell	shock	were	the	main	target	area	to	achieve	cost	savings	
(Parry	and	Codrington,	1918).		In	subsequent	appeals	against	decisions	that	cut	or	revoked	pensions,	the	
Pensions	Appeals	Tribunal	stated	it	could	not	consider	assertions	of	inequity	in	the	policy	that	drove	pension	
changes	but	could	only	determine	whether	the	pension	rules	as	they	stood	had	been	applied	(Parry	and	
Codrington,	1918).		Although	Parliament	and	the	Pensions	Appeals	Tribunal	stated	that	many	pensions	were	
revoked	as	a	consequence	of	this	review,	exact	numbers	were	not	provided.		Whether	this	is	because	they	
were	unavailable	or	secret	is	unknown.		Similarly	the	number	of	men	returned	to	Army	service	was	unstated.		
However	the	intention	and	impact	of	these	pension	changes	was	to	simultaneously	lower	pension	payments	
while	increasing	fighting	strength	(Committee	of	Public	Accounts,	1918;	Parry	and	Codrington,	1918).		The	
morality	of	sending	men	with	shell	shock	back	to	the	situation	that	caused	their	shell	shock	is	beyond	our	
comprehension	but	it	is	also	beyond	the	scope	of	this	research.		The	Chancellor	of	the	Exchequer,	Financial	
Secretary	of	the	War	Office	and	politicians	from	all	parties	spoke	in	Parliament	against	targeting	men	with	shell	
shock	for	pension	reduction	or	revocation	to	save	costs	and	re-enlisting	men	with	shell	shock.		Concern	was	
also	expressed	in	Parliament	about	Army	chairmen	being	under	Army	direction	to	destroy	medical	information	
of	shell	shock	and	override	decisions	by	medical	members	of	a	Pension	Medial	Board	that	treated	men	with	
shell	shock	sympathetically,	(United	Kingdom,	1917:	,	cc1996-2114).	
We	note	that	even	a	full	pension	could	cause	financial	hardship.		For	instance,	a	full	disablement	pension	of	40	
shillings	per	week	was	less	than	was	earned	by	an	unskilled	builder	(84	shillings	and	6	pence	per	week),	a	coal	
mining	labourer	(99	shillings	and	3	pence	per	week)	and	a	skilled	coal	getter	(135	shillings	and	6	pence	per	
week).		Pensions	did	not	increase	for	dependents	and	there	was	no	government	plan	to	re-train	ex-servicemen	
or	help	them	return	to	employment	(van	Bergen,	2009).		The	Minister	of	Pensions	refused	to	review	cases	of	
financial	hardship	or	gross	inequity	that	were	raised	in	Parliament,	stating	that	Pension	Medical	Board	
decisions	were	final.		This	forced	many	men	with	shell	shock	to	seek	local	government	relief	for	financial	
hardship,	shifting	the	cost	burden	from	national	government	to	local	boroughs	which	varied	in	their	financial	
capacity	and	the	level	of	support	they	could	offer	(United	Kingdom,	1923b:	,	cc2573-2577).		There	are	many	
instances	of	the	Minister	supporting	pension	boards	despite	the	hardship	or	unfairness	caused	of	pension	
decisions,	including	cases	where	men	hospitalised	with	shell	shock	had	pensions	revoked	and	were	therefore	
eligible	for	re-recruitment	into	the	Army.		For	example	at	HC	Deb	19	February	1918	vol	103	cc589-90	and	HC	
Deb	11	April	1922	vol	153	cc335-81.		The	Pensions	Appeals	Tribunal	was	only	available	to	those	who	could	
afford	legal	representation.		Legislation	gave	the	Minister	of	Pensions	an	overriding	discretion	to	change	
decisions.		There	are	no	accounting	records	of	exercise	of	this	discretion	in	pension	cases	concerning	men	with	
shell	shock.		If	such	discretion	was	ever	exercised,	the	records,	if	made,	have	been	destroyed	or	lost.		We	do	
not	suggest	evil	intent;	many	public	records	were	destroyed	in	the	bombing	of	London	during	the	Second	
World	War.	
Period	4:	1919-23	
This	was	the	immediate	post-war	period	when	Britain	sought	to	cut	government	spending	to	manage	national	
debt	which	rose	from	£754	million	in	1913	to	£6,142	million	in	1919	(Mitchell,	2011)	and	disablement	pensions	
were	viewed	as	a	lucrative	source	of	funds,	losing	their	construction	as	a	just	recompense	for	men	disabled	in	
the	service	of	their	country	(Jones	et	al.,	2002;	Eksteins,	2000).		In	1919	British	Government	policy	was	to	
return	the	currency	to	a	pre-war	gold	standard,	which	required	reversal	of	its	deficit	so	post-war	fiscal	policy	
was	aimed	at	debt	reduction	through	reduced	government	spending	(Aldcroft,	1973).		In	this	economic	climate	
and	with	high	post-war	unemployment,	the	Minister	of	Pensions	stated	that	pensions	for	men	with	shell	shock	
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would	be	reviewed	as	a	contribution	to	fiscal	austerity;	this	led	to	further	lowering	most	pensions	(Jones	et	al.,	
2002).		Many	of	these	pensions	were	then	revoked	by	the	Treasury,	Auditor-General	and	Committee	of	Public	
Affairs	even	though	they	did	not	have	legal	jurisdiction	over	pensions	(Parry	and	Codrington,	1918).		The	
British	Government	supported	the	revocations	as	consistent	with	the	need	for	cost-saving	and	evidence	that	
Pension	Medical	Boards	had	been	too	lenient	with	pension	determinations	for	men	with	shell	shock	
(Committee	of	Public	Accounts,	1918:	,	para.	10;	Parry	and	Codrington,	1918).	
Additional	cost	savings	were	achieved	through	administrative	and	accounting	inefficiencies.		Pensions	
commenced	from	the	date	of	a	pension	determination,	not	the	date	of	discharge,	even	though	it	could	take	
months	for	a	pension	deliberation	to	be	made	(Parry	and	Codrington,	1918).	Whenever	pensions	were	
reviewed,	all	pensions	were	stopped	but	when	payments	recommenced,	there	was	no	money	for	missed	
pension	periods	(United	Kingdom,	1918:	,	cc1839-1843).		The	Minister	of	Pensions	refused	to	re-open	cases	
that	had	been	subject	to	appeal,	even	when	inaccurate	pension	accounting	records	caused	injustice.		For	
instance,	on	8	September	1919	H.	G.	Norton	was	discharged	from	the	Army	with	shell	shock	described	as	
neurasthenia,	determined	permanently	unfit	and	awarded	a	100	per	cent	pension	entitlement.		Two	months	
later,	the	pension	was	cancelled.		Under	the	pension	rules,	a	successful	appeal	gave	a	right	to	have	the	pension	
reviewed.		It	did	not	give	the	right	to	have	a	pension	reinstated.		After	successfully	appealing	through	the	
Pensions	Appeals	Tribunal,	Norton’s	case	was	reviewed	by	a	Pension	Medical	Board	on	29	January	1920	which,	
on	the	same	medical	evidence,	determined	his	disability	to	be	30	per	cent.		The	reviewing	board	held	that	on	
enlistment,	his	disability	was	20	percent,	even	though	his	enlistment	records	showed	no	evidence	of	a	
disability,	he	had	been	found	fit	for	military	service	without	medical	impediment	by	the	British	Army	and	was	
no	pre-war	medical	evidence	of	a	disability.		Evidence	of	his	fitness	on	Army	recruitment	was	dismissed	by	the	
Army	chairman	of	the	reviewing	board,	because	he	determined	that	Army	tests	of	medical	fitness	differed	
from	pension	tests	of	medical	fitness.		No	justification	for	this	was	provided.		The	Ministry	of	Pensions	
determined	that	Army	service	had	therefore	caused	a	10	per	cent	disability	which	was	too	small	for	a	pension	
but	Norton	would	receive	a	gratuity	of	£5.		Although	pension	entitlements	increased	at	intervals	of	10	per	
cent,	the	Minister	determined	that	these	increments	applied	once	there	was	sufficient	disablement	for	a	
pension	and	10	per	cent	disablement	was	insufficient	to	warrant	a	pension.		The	pension	ceased	but	the	
gratuity	was	never	paid.		When	this	matter	was	raised	in	Parliament	as	a	case	of	improper	Ministry	of	
Pensions’	accounting,	the	Minister	of	Pensions	refused	to	investigate	it,	arguing	it	had	been	reviewed	and	
there	was	no	requirement	for	the	Minister	to	re-open	cases	of	accounting	irregularities	(United	Kingdom,	
1922a).		All	injustices	from	inaccurate	accounting	records	that	were	mentioned	in	Parliament	or	raised	in	a	
formal	appeal	pertain	to	pension	entitlements	for	men	with	shell	shock	(Parry	and	Codrington,	1918;	Holden,	
1998).	
The	Minister	of	Pensions	did	not	believe	accounting	practices	needed	to	be	reviewed	despite	evidence	of	their	
inadequacy	(United	Kingdom,	1922b).		For	instance,	Lieutenant	Verity	was	discharged	from	military	service	as	
an	invalid	suffering	from	tuberculosis.		He	was	awarded	a	full	100	per	cent	pension	by	the	Army.		However,	the	
Ministry	of	Pensions	paid	a	30	per	cent	disability	pension	for	shell	shock.		During	Parliamentary	questioning,	
the	Minister	of	Pensions	refused	to	review	the	case	because	Ministry	of	Pensions’	accounting	records	stated	
that	Verity	had	shell	shock,	despite	medical	evidence	that	he	had	never	had	shell	shock	and	was	still	being	
treated	for	tuberculosis.		On	further	questioning,	the	Minister	of	Pensions	reiterated	his	decision	but	admitted	
the	Ministry	had	no	record	of	Verity’s	disability	and	that	its	accounting	records	were	insufficient	to	determine	
whether	other	classification	errors	has	occurred	(United	Kingdom,	1922b:	1423-1414).	
Accounting	issues	worsened	in	1921,	when	the	pension	process	was	split:	despite	its	stated	antipathy	towards	
men	with	shell	shock,	the	Army	was	made	responsible	for	Army	pension	determinations	while	the	Ministry	of	
Pensions	managed	pension	payments	(Babington,	1997).		Simultaneously,	the	British	Government	determined	
that	only	medical	conditions	evident	within	seven	years	of	the	date	of	discharge	were	eligible	for	pension	
entitlement	(United	Kingdom,	1923a:	,	cc1548-1549),	disadvantaging	men	with	shell	shock,	the	only	
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pensionable	medical	condition	where	symptoms	could	manifest	many	years	after	military	service	(Johnson	and	
Rows,	1923;	Reid,	2010).		In1920,	3,700	pensions	were	awarded	to	men	with	shell	shock	(United	Kingdom,	
1920:	,	cc241-242),	rising	to	6,900	in	1923	(United	Kingdom,	1923a).		This	may	understate	the	actual	number	
because	it	only	considers	pensions	for	conditions	the	Ministry	of	Pensions	classified	as	synonymous	with	shell	
shock,	such	as	neurasthenia	but	it	ignores	blindness,	deafness	and	similar	physical	manifestations	of	the	
condition.	
In	1923	the	War	Pensions	Acts	1915	to	1921	Amendment	Bill	1923	changed	the	onus	of	proof	in	disablement	
pension	cases	from	the	claimant	to	the	Minister	of	Pensions.		At	the	time,	over	250,000	applications	by	men	
seeking	pensions	exclusively	attributable	to	shell	shock	had	been	rejected	(United	Kingdom,	1923b:	,	cc2573-
7).		Statistics	are	unavailable	for	men	who	paid	for	private	health	care	or	who	received	inadequate	or	no	health	
care	because	adverse	pension	determinations	precluded	them	from	the	public	health	care	system.			
The	cost	and	quality	of	publicly	funded	medical	care	to	men	with	shell	shock	was	a	political	issue	in	post-war	
Britain	(Aldcroft,	1973):	the	Minister	of	Pensions	turned	it	into	an	administrative	issue	by	stating	that	the	
administrative	costs	of	British	public	health	care	were	four	pence	per	British	pound	spent	on	health	care,	and	
that	these	were	lower	than	any	other	country.		He	also	stated	that	Britain	had	been	able	to	keep	the	cost	of	
public	health	care	for	men	with	shell	shock	to	an	average	of	£20	per	man	because	of	the	efficiency	of	the	
pension	entitlement	system.		The	Minister	did	not	respond	to	Opposition	questions	about	whether	avoiding	
the	payment	of	pensions	to	men	with	shell	shock	was	a	strategy	to	minimise	health	care	spending	(United	
Kingdom,	1940:	,	cc317-424).	
Although	our	research	focuses	on	men	with	shell	shock,	British	Parliamentary	debates	and	Pension	Tribunals	
Appeals	show	issues	pertaining	to	pensions	for	other	medical	conditions	although	they	are	much	less	frequent	
than	issues	pertaining	to	pensions	for	shell	shock	disablement.		In	the	following	section,	our	discussion	of	the	
implications	for	accounting	of	the	disablement	pension	scheme	focuses	exclusively	on	the	pension	scheme	as	
it	applied	to	men	with	shell	shock.	
Discussion	
In	every	War	Pension	history	there	comes	a	time	within	a	few	years	of	war	when	the	new	generation	desires	to	
get	rid	of	its	liabilities	(Parry	and	Codrington,	1918:	51).	
In	this	section	we	discuss	how	accounting	can	transition	from	a	social	construct	reflecting	and/or	creating	
morality	to	a	neutral	technical	inscription.		Of	interest	is	how	accounting	can	be	both	morally	laden	and	free	
from	morality	at	the	same	time.		To	explain	this	apparent	contradiction,	we	use	the	accounting	system	that	
supported	disablement	pensions	for	men	with	shell	shock	sustained	during	their	service	in	the	British	Army	
during	the	First	World	War.		Our	analysis	is	divided	into	three	parts:	how	the	pension	accounting	system	
facilitated	the	scapegoating	of	men	with	shell	shock,	how	the	pension	accounting	system	distanced	pension	
decision-makers	from	the	morality	of	their	decisions	and	how	the	pension	accounting	system	helped	pension	
decision-makers	avoid	blame	for	the	decisions	they	made.	
Scapegoating	
Pensions	of	men	with	shell	shock	were	a	target	of	Ministry	of	Pensions’	cost	savings.		Reduced	and	revoked	
pensions	provided	cost	savings.		Revocation	had	flow-on	financial	implications:	men	without	pensions	were	
ineligible	for	public	health	care.		This	provided	additional	cost	savings	to	the	British	Government.		In	addition,	
men	whose	pensions	were	revoked	were	eligible	for	recall	into	the	British	Army,	which	helped	maintain	
fighting	strength.		The	British	Government	accepted	the	British	Army’s	view	that	the	military	force	with	the	
most	men	standing	after	decisive	battles	would	be	the	ultimate	victor	(van	Bergen,	2009;	Brown,	1998).		
Pension	determinations	for	shell	shock	were	difficult	because	symptoms	did	not	manifest	in	the	same	way	in	
each	person.		Symptoms	could	change	over	time	and	fluctuate	in	severity	so	medical	assessments	at	one	point	
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in	time	might	not	represent	manifestations	of	shell	shock	at	a	different	point	in	time.		If	medical	conditions	
changed,	pension	payments	might	be	expected	to	change	so	this	goes	some	way	towards	explaining	why	the	
Ministry	of	Pensions	might	have	selected	pensions	for	shell	shock	for	regular	review	but	it	fails	to	explain	why	
so	many	pensions	for	men	with	shell	shock	were	reduced	when	medical	evidence	showed	no	improvement	in	
the	condition	or	were	revoked.		It	does	not	explain	why	the	Minister	of	Pensions	refused	to	consider	cases	of	
injustice,	why	there	were	more	appeals	about	pensions	for	shell	shock	than	any	other	medical	condition	or	
why	so	many	applications	for	pensions	from	men	with	shell	shock	were	rejected.		It	also	fails	to	explain	why	
accounting	classifications	for	pension	determinations	failed	to	include	suitable	terminology	for	shell	shock	
conditions	when	shell	shock	was	the	second	most	frequent	cause	of	Army	discharge	for	disablement	(Parry	
and	Codrington,	1918)	and	even	though	the	pension	categories	purported	to	cover	every	reason	for	medical	
discharge	(Ministry	of	Pensions,	1919).	
Men	with	pensions	for	shell	shock	conditions	became	scapegoats	for	the	British	Government.		The	ambiguity	
associated	with	their	illness	meant	their	pensions	were	re-assessed	more	frequently	than	men	with	other	
medical	conditions	(Holden,	1998;	United	Kingdom,	1918).		When	the	British	medical	profession	disputed	the	
legitimacy	of	shell	shock,	Pension	Medical	Boards	were	staffed	by	doctors	but	this	changed	at	the	same	time	
the	medical	opinion	recognised	shell	shock	as	a	medical	condition	so	that	a	British	Army	officer	was	given	the	
deciding	vote	on	all	Board	decisions.		At	this	time,	the	British	Government	was	concerned	about	increasing	
Army	recruitment	levels	to	maintain	its	fighting	strength	(Brown,	1998).		Since	the	British	Army	viewed	shell	
shock	as	a	sign	of	weakness,	exacerbation	of	a	pre-existing	nervous	disposition	or	cowardice,	its	involvement	in	
pension	decisions	meant	a	significant	number	of	pensions	were	revoked,	particularly	for	men	with	shell	shock	
(Parry	and	Codrington,	1918).	
There	are	always	scapegoats	in	society	and	they	are	treated	with	violence.		Violence	does	not	need	to	be	
physical:	it	can	take	any	form	including	discriminatory	treatment	if	scapegoated	are	viewed	as	accessing	
resources	that	others	want	to	or	should	be	able	to	access.		(Girard,	1986;	Fleming,	2004).		Girard	observed	that	
in	punishing	the	scapegoats	in	society,	others	avoid	punishment.		In	the	context	of	disablement	pensions,	by	
targeting	men	with	shell	shock	for	pension	reduction,	men	whose	medical	conditions	were	not	contentious,	
such	as	amputations,	were	not	punished	financially	by	pension	cuts.	
Girard	(1987)	examined	religious	and	historical	examples	of	scapegoating	to	conclude	that	scapegoats,	
regardless	of	their	guilt	or	innocence,	are	treated	with	violence	so	society	as	a	whole	may	escape	it.		During	
the	British	Government’s	post-war	fiscal	tightening,	reducing	pensions	for	men	with	shell	shock	made	the	
Ministry	of	Pensions	a	team	player	that	was	meeting	government	cost-cutting	objectives.		When	the	Treasury,	
Auditor-General	and	Committee	of	Public	Affairs	revoked	pensions	for	men	with	shell	shock	they	acted	outside	
their	jurisdiction	yet	the	decisions	were	not	challenged,	suggesting	that	greater	cost-saving	from	revoked	
pensions	for	shell	shock	would	save	the	British	Government	money	and	lessen	the	severity	of	other	cost-saving	
measures	imposed	as	the	Government	sought	to	lower	debt.	
The	Ministry	of	Pensions	failed	to	include	shell	shock	in	the	pension	accounting	classifications	in	a	way	that	
facilitated	pension	determinations	for	men	with	shell	shock,	even	though	there	were	opportunities	to	do	so	
when	the	classification	system	was	reviewed.		This	suggests	men	with	shell	shock	were	scapegoats	of	pension	
system	where	it	was	advantageous	to	retain	ambiguity	in	the	classification	of	their	medical	condition	but	it	
also	reflects	the	use	of	accounting	classifications	to	make	a	moral	choice	about	the	disabled	soldiers	whose	
medical	conditions	make	them	worthy	of	ongoing	financial	aid	via	the	pension	system.	
Distancing	
Accounting	classifications	that	distance	government	decision-makers	from	making	moral	judgments	and	turn	
their	decisions	into	administrative	efficiencies	can	lessen	the	visibility	of	inequities	that	might	be	apparent	if	
the	moral	consequences	of	decision-making	were	visible.		Processes	or	rules	that	governments	use	to	distance	
their	decisions	or	actions	from	moral	consequences	have	been	described	as	a	type	of	violence	perpetrated	
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against	those	whom	civilising	society	is	supposed	to	protect	(Giroux,	2010;	Sumner,	1996).		Men	suffering	from	
shell	shock	deserved	the	protection	of	society	since	they	had	been	made	vulnerable	because	they	fought	to	
protect	that	society.		The	violence	perpetrated	against	them	by	the	Ministry	of	Pensions	was	moral	rather	than	
physical	but	moral	violence	is	harder	to	fight	because	the	process	of	instigating	rules	and	processes	to	support	
government	decision-making	give	the	illusion	of	equity	and	fairness	in	that	the	same	rules	and	processes	are	
applied	to	all	decisions	in	the	same	way.		The	use	of	rules,	processes	and	tools	of	classification	such	as	
accounting	to	enable	decisions	that	distance	decision-makers	from	the	moral	consequences	of	their	decisions	
has	been	termed	“adiaphorization”	(Bauman,	1988).		Bauman	(1996)	adopts	the	term	adiaphorization	to	
describe	distancing	mechanisms	that	lead	to	actions	or	objects	being	treated	as	morally	neutral	so	they	can	be	
made	without	moral	evaluation.		The	term	adiaphorism	is	taken	from	Judeo-Christian	religion	where	it	refers	
to	things	that	are	neither	forbidden	nor	mandated	by	religious	scriptures	and	are	therefore	of	indifference	to	
the	institution	of	the	church.		Bauman	(1988)	uses	the	Nazi	construction	of	the	Holocaust	as	an	administrative	
efficiency	as	an	example	of	adiaphorization	that	allowed	Nazi	decision-makers	to	distance	themselves	from	the	
morality	of	decisions	and	eradicate	populations.		The	Holocaust	example	shows	that	even	the	most	extreme	
actions	are	rendered	neither	morally	good	nor	bad	by	rules	or	processes	that	distance	decision-makers	from	
the	moral	consequences	of	their	decisions.		In	separating	decision-makers	from	the	moral	consequences	of	
their	decisions,	it	is	easier	for	a	government	to	control	outcomes	in	society	by	implementation	of	unfavourable	
or	unpopular	decisions	(Bauman,	1988).			
Bauman	(1988)	describes	moral	judgements	as	disruptions	that	interfere	with	the	smooth	running	of	
government.		Hence,	government	wants	processes	and	rules	that	separate	decisions	from	their	moral	
consequences	so	it	runs	smoothly	(Poder	and	Jacobsen,	2012).		Since	society	want	a	smooth-running	
government,	adiaphorizing	processes	are	unlikely	to	be	challenged.		This	does	not	negate	the	possibility	of	
dissent	within	society.		Rather,	it	refers	to	the	widespread	disagreement	of	society.	
Bauman	recognises	three	aspects	to	distancing.		First,	there	must	be	a	system	that	stretches	the	relationship	
between	an	action	and	its	consequences.		The	Ministry	of	Pensions	stretched	the	relationship	between	action	
and	consequences	by	requiring	Medical	Pension	Boards	to	make	pension	determinations	without	examining	or	
interviewing	the	men	whose	cases	they	were	considering	and	by	limiting	pension	determinations	to	a	closed	
set	of	results	so	decisions	were	constrained	by	accounting	classifications	of	medical	conditions.		Pension	
Medical	Boards	decided	which	evidence	they	would	consider	in	making	their	determination	and	since	the	
reasons	for	their	decisions	were	not	disclosed,	appeals	decisions	were	rare	(Parry	and	Codrington,	1918).		
Second,	the	system	must	be	applied	to	some	people,	but	not	others,	in	a	way	that	avoided	moral	impulse.		
Men	with	amputations	and	wounds	were	easy	to	classify	under	the	pension	entitlement	system.		The	location	
of	the	primary	wound	or	level	of	amputation	determined	the	pension	entitlement.		For	instance,	men	with	loss	
of	two	limbs	received	different	accounting	classifications	depending	whether	their	amputations	included	an	
arm	amputated	below	the	elbow,	an	arm	amputated	above	the	elbow	with	a	stump	of	more	than	6	inches	or	
an	arm	amputated	within	six	inches	of	the	shoulder.		Men	whose	shell	shock	made	symptom	identification	
problematic	and	who	had	a	number	of	symptoms,	which	is	the	norm	with	shell	shock	(Babington,	1997),	were	
at	the	mercy	of	those	applying	the	rigid	classification	system	that	at	best,	would	lead	to	a	pension	award	based	
on	the	most	debilitating	symptom	covered	by	the	accounting	classifications	(van	Bergen,	2009).		Third,	the	
system	must	identify	specific	traits	used	to	classify	and	separate	from	moral	judgement	(Bauman	and	Donskis,	
2013).		Since	men	with	shell	shock	were	awarded	pensions	based	on	a	Pension	Medical	Board	assessment	of	
their	most	debilitating	symptom	within	pension	accounting	classification,	decision-makers	were	selecting	one	
symptom	based	on	an	incomplete	list	of	shell	shock	symptoms	and	using	that	symptom	to	determine	a	
pension	entitlement.		Ministry	of	Pension	decisions	were	defensible	by	reference	to	the	accounting	
classifications	but	not	if	pension	determinations	are	considered	a	moral	judgment.		The	Minister	of	Pensions	
defended	even	the	most	blatantly	unfair	pension	decisions	by	stating	they	were	in	accordance	with	the	
accounting	classifications;	at	no	time	did	he	recognise	the	classifications	might	need	to	be	expanded,	which	
would	have	involved	moral	choices	about	the	validity	of	shell	shock	as	a	medical	condition.	
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Accounting	classification	provided	the	tool	of	adiaphorization	that	allowed	pension	decision	makers	to	remove	
moral	judgement	from	pension	determination.		By	rigid	application	of	the	accounting	classifications,	pension	
decisions	appeared	morally	neutral	despite	their	bias	against	men	with	shell	shock.		This	made	it	easier	for	
pension	decision	makers	to	reduce	pensions	even	though	it	would	cause	financial	hardship	or	revoke	pensions	
despite	the	financial	hardship,	loss	of	access	to	public	health	care	and	likelihood	a	man	would	be	returned	to	
Army	service	and	the	conditions	that	had	caused	the	shell	shock.		Since	accounting	classification	had	turned	
pension	determinations	into	morally	neutral	decisions,	adiaphorization	of	pension	processes	meant	there	was	
no	outcry	when	the	Treasurer	and	Auditor-General	reduced	and	revoked	pensions	to	lower	government	
spending,	even	though	both	acted	ultra	vires	(Parry	and	Codrington,	1918).	
When	disablement	pensions	were	introduced,	they	were	compensation	to	men	disabled	in	the	service	of	their	
country	and	a	system	predicated	on	ensuring	men	who	left	civilian	employment	were	afforded	compensation	
equivalent	to	compensation	available	for	similar	disablement	in	that	employment.		In	practice,	accounting	
classification	made	pension	determinations	an	administratively	efficient	way	of	managing	the	ongoing	cost	to	
the	British	Government	of	men’s	wartime	disablement.		Thus,	when	the	Minister	of	Pensions	announced	in	
Parliament	that	the	British	Government’s	pension	administrative	costs	were	lower	than	those	of	other	
countries,	this	was	accepted	as	signalling	the	Ministry	of	Pensions	was	financially	efficient	and	effective.		He	
also	claimed	administrative	costs	were	lower	than	those	of	private	charitable	institutions	even	though	those	
institutions	were	established	to	provide	medical	care	to	men	with	shell	shock	refused	pensions	by	the	British	
Government	and	hence	unable	to	receive	public	medical	care.	
Accounting	classification	enabled	decision-makers	to	distance	themselves	from	the	moral	consequences	of	
adverse	decisions	concerning	pensions	for	men	with	shell	shock.		The	Ministry	of	pensions	needed	to	use	a	
distancing	mechanism	such	as	accounting	because	it	provide	a	method	of	blame	avoidance	for	its	decisions,	
particularly	the	many	decisions	that	were	financially	deleterious	to	men	with	shell	shock.	
Blaming	
Hood	has	identified	that	public	office-holders	seek	to	deflect	or	educe	blame	from	unpopular	or	adverse	
decisions	(Hood,	2002).		Extant	literature	recognises	the	need	for	blame	avoidance	by	government	to	avoid	
financial	risks	(Black,	2006).		In	the	regulation	of	health,	blame	avoidance	has	been	linked	to	preservation	of	
the	careers	of	politicians	and	public	servants	(Hood	et	al.,	2001).		The	success	of	campaigns	to	raise	private	
donations	and	opening	of	private	medical	facilitates	for	men	with	shell	shock	who	had	been	refused	pensions	
or	whose	pensions	had	been	revoked	indicates	that	there	was	a	substantial	level	of	public	sympathy	for	these	
men	and	the	likelihood	of	public	resentment	towards	the	British	Government	for	the	financial	treatment	of	
men	with	shell	shock	(Babington,	1997).	
Three	main	strategies	have	been	identified	for	deflecting	or	avoiding	blame.		First,	presentational	strategies	
involve	argument,	spin	or	stage	management	and	other	techniques	to	shape	public	impression	(Hood,	2007).		
The	Minister	of	Pensions	appears	to	be	careful	in	his	responses	to	Parliamentary	questions,	referring	always	to	
Pension	Medical	Board	responsibility	rather	than	the	Ministry	of	Pensions	in	issues	concerning	pension	
determinations.		Thus,	he	is	seen	to	be	supporting	the	opinions	of	medical	experts.		Second,	agency	strategies	
using	the	complexity	of	government	agency	relationships	and	agency	structures	to	draw	complex	lines	of	
responsibility	so	it	unclear	where	a	decision	was	made	and	rotating	staff	who	may	be	blamed	for	a	decision	so	
it	is	unclear	who	made	the	decision	(Hood	et	al.,	2009).		Although	from	a	legislative	perspective,	the	Minister	
of	Pensions	was	responsible	for	pension	determination,	he	saw	the	decision	of	Pension	Medical	Boards	as	final	
(Ministry	of	Pensions,	1919;	Minister	of	Pensions,	1917).		However,	Board	members	came	from	the	medical	
profession	so	their	decisions	so	adverse	pension	determinations	could	be	constructed	as	emanating	from	the	
medical	profession	rather	than	the	Ministry	of	Pensions	(Holden,	1998).		Third,	policy	strategies	involve	
implementing	routines	and	processes	that	minimise	individual	or	institutional	liability	or	blame	(Weaver,	
1986).		The	stringent	accounting	classification	of	medical	conditions	used	by	the	Ministry	of	Pensions	provided	
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a	Nuremberg	defence:	when	pension	decisions	were	challenged	in	Parliament,	the	Minister	of	Pension’s	
invariable	response	was	that	pension	decision-makers	were	merely	following	the	rules.		Following	the	
accounting	classifications	was	so	strongly	enculturated	that	when	the	records	of	the	Ministry	of	Pension	were	
shown	to	be	incorrect	in	the	case	of	Lieutenant	Verity,	they	were	not	corrected.		Instead	the	Minister	of	
Pensions	deflected	criticism	by	asserting	that	the	records	had	been	accurately	used	to	make	a	pension	
determination	consistent	with	accounting	classifications.		The	strategies	for	blame	avoidance	are	not	
necessarily	discrete.		Hood	(2002)	would	categorise	the	type	of	policy	automaticity	enabled	by	the	accounting	
classifications	as	a	hybrid	between	agency	and	policy	strategies	and	maintaining	accounting	classifications	that	
facilitated	discriminatory	scapegoating	of	men	with	shell	shock	as	a	hybrid	of	presentational	and	policy	
strategies.		
Blame	avoidance	is	also	avoidance	of	responsibility	(Hood,	2002).		Once	decision-makers	can	avoid	
responsibility	for	their	decisions,	distancing	mechanisms	are	more	likely	to	succeed	(Folger	and	Skarlicki,	1998)	
and	so	is	scapegoating	(Douglas,	1995).		In	the	case	of	pensions	for	men	with	shell	shock,	accounting	
classification	facilitated	the	distancing	of	pension	decision-makers	from	the	morality	of	making	men	with	shell	
shock	scapegoats	of	government	cost-cutting	and	provided	a	tool	that	supported	blame	avoidance	by	the	
Minister	of	Pensions	for	pension	determinations	made	by	the	Ministry	of	Pensions.		The	role	of	accounting	
classification	in	this	process	is	complex	but	it	is	also	flexible.		By	focusing	on	that	flexibility,	it	provides	an	
example	of	accounting	simultaneously	acting	as	technical	inscription	while	reflecting	and	creating	the	morality	
in	which	the	decisions	it	supports	are	made.	
Conclusion	
The	case	of	disablement	pensions	for	shell	shock	provides	a	challenge	to	interpretations	of	accounting	that	
might	seek	to	dichotomise	its	role	as	technical	or	morally	and	socially	grounded.		In	government	decision-
making,	the	two	often	occur	simultaneously.		During	the	period	covered	by	our	research,	the	Ministry	of	
Pensions	viewed	accounting	as	an	expenditure	control	tool	rather	than	one	for	decision-making	(Ministry	of	
Pensions,	1919).		Accounting	classification	of	medical	conditions	for	pension	determination	purposes	provided	
the	illusion	of	fair	and	neutral	decision-making	to	the	extent	that	Pension	Medical	Boards	classified	medical	
conditions	according	to	the	criteria	in	the	classification	schema.		However,	the	failure	to	include	suitable	
accounting	classifications	for	men	with	shell	shock	both	in	the	development	of	the	classifications	when	they	
were	introduced	and	in	later	revisions	to	the	accounting	classification	when	the	scheme	moved	from	
assessments	at	25	per	cent	increments	to	10	per	cent	increments	suggests	that	problematic	classification	of	
shell	shock	was	deliberate.		Our	discussion	on	scapegoating,	distancing	and	blaming	suggest	why	this	might	
have	served	the	British	Government.		Although	neutrality	in	decisions	concerning	shell	shock	may	have	been	
an	illusion,	there	is	no	evidence	that	the	classifications	were	not	applied	in	a	neutral	and	stringent	manner	to	
medical	conditions	from	battle	wounds	or	other	illnesses	associated	with	trench	warfare.	
It	is	arguable	that	the	accounting	classifications	were	applied	neutrally	to	men	with	shell	shock	and	the	
problem	was	not	with	how	they	were	applied	but	with	classifications	themselves.		We	have	refuted	this	in	our	
discussion	of	scapegoating	but	apart	from	that	discussion,	determining	the	level	of	pension	men	deserve	for	
various	medical	conditions	occasioned	through	their	war	service	is	always	a	moral	decision	by	government	in	
that	it	is	determining	appropriate	recompense	for	disablement	while	serving	one’s	country.		Distancing	
separates	decision-makers	from	the	morality	for	the	purposes	of	making	their	decisions	but	it	does	not	alter	
the	underlying	morality	of	the	choices	they	are	making.		Hence,	accounting	classification	that	awards	or	denies	
pensions,	and	choices	about	the	level	of	pension	for	a	particular	type	of	disablement	is	essentially	a	moral	
choice.		Thus,	irrespective	of	the	level	of	neutrality	in	the	accounting	processes	that	underpin	a	government	
decision,	decisions	that	impact	on	the	social	fabric	of	society	such	as	pension	decisions	that	determine	ongoing	
financial	capacity	within	society,	and	are	often	linked	to	status	in	society,	are	always	connected	to	a	moral	
imperative.	
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While	we	would	not	exclude	the	possibility	that	private	sector	accounting	can	serve	as	technical	inscription	
while	being	grounded	in	moral	imperative,	particularly	in	such	areas	as	corporate	environmental	expenditure,	
we	leave	analysis	of	private	sector	accounting	to	future	research.		From	the	case	of	disablement	pensions	for	
shell	shock,	we	see	that	government	accounting	can	serve	both	as	neutral	inscription	and	as	a	social	and	moral	
construct.		The	significance	of	this	is	the	challenge	it	presents	for	re-framing	extant	research	to	make	visible	a	
broader	role	for	accounting.	
Examination	of	disablement	pensions	for	men	with	shell	shock	from	their	service	in	the	British	Army	during	the	
First	World	War	provides	a	corrective	to	extant	research	that	might	view	accounting	as	a	dichotomy	that	is	
either	a	neutral	inscription	or	a	social	and	moral	construct.		However	our	analysis	is	time	and	context	specific	
so	further	research	will	be	required	to	test	the	conclusions	suggested	by	this	illustrative	example	suggests.		We	
recognise	that	the	role	of	government	and	the	use	by	governments	of	accounting	information	have	changed	
significantly	since	the	First	World	War	so	further	research	of	the	accounting	issues	raised	in	this	research	may	
require	re-design	to	take	into	account	features	of	contemporary	government	and	contemporary	public	sector	
accounting.		The	view	expressed	in	this	research	is	that	government	accounting	is	often	broader	and	can	
provide	both	a	neutral	inscription	and	meet	a	moral	imperative.		Although	not	viewing	this	flexibility	and	
adaptability	of	accounting	as	exclusively	the	province	of	government	accounting,	we	do	consider	the	complex	
nature	of	accounting	in	government	lends	itself	to	a	broad	role	for	accounting.		Although	the	disablement	
pensions	example	we	use	came	from	a	time	when	government	accounting	was	for	the	purposes	of	
expenditure	control,	moral	imperatives	need	not	be	stated	to	exist:	we	would	contend	that	fiscal	spending	is	
always	underpinned	in	morality	because	it	involves	choices	that	can	vary	in	their	benefit	to	society	and/or	
individuals	in	that	society.	
Acknowledgements	
For	John	Owen	Rees,	invalided	by	his	Army	service	in	the	First	World	War	to	then	be	disadvantaged	by	the	
disablement	pension	scheme.		We	wish	to	thank	Kerry	Jacobs	and	two	anonymous	referees	for	their	helpful	
comments.	
References	
Aldcroft	DH.	(1973)	The	interwar	economy	1919-39	London:	Batsford.	
Babington	A.	(1997)	Shell	shock:	A	history	of	the	changing	attitudes	to	war	neurosis,	London:	Leo	
Cooper.	
Bauman	Z.	(1988)	Sociology	after	the	Holocaust.	British	Journal	of	Sociology	39:	469-497.	DOI:	
10.2307/590497.	
Bauman	Z.	(1996)	From	pilgrim	to	tourist–or	a	short	history	of	identity.	In:	Stuart	H	and	Du	Gay,	Paul	
(eds)	Questions	of	cultural	identity.	London:	Sage	Publications	Ltd,	18-36.	
Bauman	Z	and	Donskis	L.	(2013)	Moral	blindness:	The	loss	of	sensitivity	in	liquid	modernity,	
Cambridge:	Polity	Press.	
Bayou	ME,	Reinstein	A	and	Williams	PF.	(2011)	To	tell	the	truth:	A	discussion	of	issues	concerning	
truth	and	ethics	in	accounting.	Accounting,	Organizations	and	Society	36:	109-124.	DOI:	
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2011.02.001.	
Bichescu	D,	Neuner	F,	Schauer	M,	et	al.	(2007)	Narrative	exposure	therapy	for	political	
imprisonment-related	chronic	posttraumatic	stress	disorder	and	depression.	Behaviour	
research	and	therapy	45:	2212-2220.	DOI:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.brat.2006.12.006.	
Black	J.	(2006)	Managing	regulatory	risks	and	defining	the	parameters	of	blame:	A	focus	on	the	
Australian	Prudential	Regulation	Authority.	Law	&	Policy	28:	1-30.	DOI:	10.1111/j.1467-
9930.2005.00215.x.	
Boyns	T	and	Edwards	JR.	(2006)	The	development	of	cost	and	management	accounting	in	Britain.	
Handbooks	of	Management	Accounting	Research	2:	969-1034.	
	17	
	
British	Expeditionary	Force.	(1922)	Army	report	of	the	War	Office	enquiry	into	"shell	shock".	London:	
His	Majesty's	Stationery	Office.	
Brown	IM.	(1998)	British	logistics	on	the	western	front	1914-1919,	London:	Praeger.	
Committee	of	Public	Accounts.	(1918)	Second	report	of	the	Select	Committee	on	National	
Expenditure,	London:	HMSO.	
Cruttwell	C.	(1934)	A	history	of	the	great	war,	1914-1918:	Clarendon	Press	Oxford.	
Dillard	JF.	(1991)	Accounting	as	a	critical	social	science.	Accounting,	Auditing	&	Accountability	Journal	
4:	8-28.	DOI:	10.1108/09513579110143849.	
Douglas	T.	(1995)	Scapegoats:	transferring	blame,	London:	Routledge.	
Eksteins	M.	(2000)	Rites	of	spring:	The	Great	War	and	the	birth	of	the	modern	age:	Houghton	Mifflin	
Harcourt.	
Ezzamel	M.	(2009)	Order	and	accounting	as	a	performative	ritual:	Evidence	from	ancient	Egypt.	
Accounting,	Organizations	and	Society	34:	348-380.	DOI:	10.1016/j.aos.2008.07.004.	
Fleming	C.	(2004)	René	Girard:	Violence	and	Mimesis:	Polity	Cambridge.	
Folger	R	and	Skarlicki	DP.	(1998)	When	tough	times	make	tough	bosses:	Managerial	distancing	as	a	
function	of	layoff	blame.	Academy	of	Management	Journal	41:	79-87.	DOI:	10.2307/256899		
Forbes	D,	Creamer	M	and	Biddle	D.	(2001)	The	validity	of	the	PTSD	checklist	as	a	measure	of	
symptomatic	change	in	combat-related	PTSD.	Behaviour	research	and	therapy	39:	977-986.	
DOI:	10.1016/S0005-7967(00)00084-X.	
Funnell	WN.	(2006)	National	efficiency,	military	accounting	and	the	business	of	war.	Critical	
Perspectives	on	Accounting	17:	719-751.	DOI:	10.1016/j.cpa.2004.11.008.	
Girard	R.	(1986)	The	Scapegoat	[1982].	Trans.	Yvonne	Freccero.	Baltimore:	Johns	Hopkins	UP.	
Girard	R.	(1987)	Generative	scapegoating.	Violent	Origins,	Ritual	Killing	and.	
Giroux	SS.	(2010)	Between	race	and	reason:	Violence,	intellectual	responsibility,	and	the	university	to	
come:	Stanford	University	Press.	
Head	HA.	(1916)	A	discussion	on	shell	shock.	The	Lancet	i:	306-307.	
Hines	RD.	(1988)	Financial	accounting:	In	communicating	reality,	we	construct	reality.	Accounting,	
Organizations	and	Society	13:	251-261.	DOI:	10.1016/0361-3682(88)90003-7,.	
Holden	W.	(1998)	Shell	shock,	London:	Channel	4	Books.	
Hood	C.	(2002)	The	risk	game	and	the	blame	game.	Government	and	opposition	37:	15-37.	DOI:	
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1477-7053.00085.	
Hood	C.	(2007)	What	happens	when	transparency	meets	blame-avoidance?	Public	Management	
Review	9:	191-210.	DOI:	10.1080/14719030701340275.	
Hood	C,	Jennings	W,	Dixon	R,	et	al.	(2009)	Testing	times:	Exploring	staged	responses	and	the	impact	
of	blame	management	strategies	in	two	examination	fiasco	cases.	European	Journal	of	
Political	Research	48:	695-722.	DOI:	10.1111/j.1475-6765.2009.01830.x.	
Hood	C,	Rothstein	H	and	Baldwin	R.	(2001)	The	government	of	risk:	Understanding	risk	regulation	
regimes,	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press.	
Hopwood	AG.	(1987)	The	archeology	of	accounting	systems.	Accounting,	Organizations	and	Society	
12:	207-234.	DOI:	10.1016/0361-3682(87)90038-9.	
Johnson	W	and	Rows	RG.	(1923)	Neurastenia	and	war	neuroses.	History	of	the	Great	War	medical	
services:	Diseases	of	the	war.	London:	His	Majesty's	Stationery	Office.	
Jones	E.	(2007)	Shell	shock	and	mild	traumatic	brain	injury:	A	historical	review.	American	Journal	of	
Psychiatry	164:	1641-1645.	DOI:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1176/appi.ajp.2007.07071180.	
Jones	E,	Palmer	I	and	Wessely	S.	(2002)	War	pensions	(1900-1945):	Changing	models	of	
psychological	understanding.	The	British	Journal	of	Psychology	180:	374-379.	DOI:	
10.1192/bjp.180.4.374		
Loft	A.	(1986)	Towards	a	critical	understanding	of	accounting:	The	case	of	cost	accounting	in	the	
U.K.,	1914-1925.	Accounting,	Organizations	and	Society	11:	137-169.	DOI:	10.1016/0361-
3682(86)90028-0.	
	18	
	
MacLeod	AD.	(2004)	Shell	shock,	Gordon	Holmes	and	the	Great	War.	Journal	of	the	Royal	Society	of	
Medicine	97:	86-89.	DOI:	http://jrs.sagepub.com/content/97/2/86.short.	
McDonald	SD	and	Calhoun	PS.	(2010)	The	diagnostic	accuracy	of	the	PTSD	Checklist:	A	critical	review.	
Clinical	Psychology	Review	30:	976-987.	DOI:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cpr.2010.06.012.	
McKernan	JF.	(2007)	Objectivity	in	accounting.	Accounting,	Organizations	and	Society	32:	155-180.	
DOI:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2006.03.008.	
McSweeney	B.	(1997)	The	unbearable	ambiguity	of	accounting.	Accounting,	Organizations	and	
Society	22:	691-712.	DOI:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0361-3682(96)00039-6.	
Merksey	H.	(1979)	The	analysis	of	hysteria,	London:	Gaskell.	
Miley	FM	and	Read	AF.	(2014)	Cartoons	as	alternative	accounting:	front-line	supply	in	the	First	World	
War.	Accounting	History	Review	24:	161-189.	DOI:	10.1080/21552851.2014.967932.	
Miley	FM	and	Read	AF.	(2015)	“Broken	and	mad”:	Accounting,	shell	shock	and	the	British	Army	
medical	unit	1914-18.	20th	Conference	on	the	History	of	Management	and	Organisations	
Lille,	France:	Association	pour	l’histoire	du	management	et	des	organisations.	
Minister	of	Pensions.	(1917)	Royal	warrant	for	the	pensions	of	soldiers	disabled,	and	of	the	families	
and	dependants	of	soldiers	deceased,	in	consequence	of	the	present	war,	together	with	
Order	in	Council	and	Regulations	for	pensions	of	British	seamen	and	marines,	their	widows,	
relatives	and	dependants.	(presented	in	pursuance	of	the	Pensions	and	Yeomanry	Pay	Act,	
1884,	and	of	the	Naval	and	Marine	Pay	and	Pensions	Act,	1865.).	Ordered	by	the	House	of	
Commons.	In:	Pensions	Mo	(ed).	London:	HMSA.	
Ministry	of	Pensions.	(1919)	First	Annual	Report	of	the	Minister	of	Pensions	to	31	March	1918,	
London:	HMSO.	
Mitchell	BR.	(2011)	British	historical	statistics,	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press.	
Morgan	G.	(1988)	Accounting	as	reality	construction:	Towards	a	new	epistemology	for	accounting	
practice.	Accounting,	Organizations	and	Society	13:	477-485.	DOI:	10.1016/0361-
3682(88)90018-9.	
Mott	FN.	(1919)	War	neuroses	and	shell	shock,	London:	Henry	Frowde	and	Hodder	and	Staunton.	
Mouck	T.	(2004)	Institutional	reality,	financial	reporting	and	the	rules	of	the	game.	Accounting,	
Organizations	and	Society	29:	525-541.	DOI:	10.1016/S0361-3682(03)00035-7.	
Myers,	Sir,	Charles.	(1915)	A	contribution	to	the	study	of	shell	shock.	The	Lancet	1:	316-320.	
Parry	EA	and	Codrington	AE.	(1918)	War	pensions:	Past	and	present,	London:	Nisbet	and	Co.	
Poder	P	and	Jacobsen	MH.	(2012)	The	sociology	of	Zygmunt	Bauman:	Challenges	and	critique:	
Ashgate	Publishing,	Ltd.	
Reid	F.	(2010)	Broken	men	-	shell	shock,	treatment	and	recovery	in	Britain	1914-1930,	London:	
Continuum.	
Rivers	WHR.	(1917)	Freud's	psychology	of	the	unconscious.	The	Lancet	1:	912-914.	
Rivers	WHR.	(1918a)	An	address	on	the	repression	of	war	experience.	The	Lancet	1:	173-177.	
Rivers	WHR.	(1918b)	War	neuroses	and	military	training.	Mental	Hygiene	2:	513-533.	
Robson	K.	(1992)	Accounting	numbers	as	“inscription”:	action	at	a	distance	and	the	development	of	
accounting.	Accounting,	Organizations	and	Society	17:	685-708.	DOI:	10.1016/0361-
3682(92)90019-O.	
Salmon	TW.	(1917)	The	care	and	treatment	of	mental	diseases	and	war	neuroses	("shell	shock")	in	
the	British	Army.	Mental	Hygiene	1:	509-547.	
Smith	GE	and	Fear	TH.	(1917)	Shell	shock	and	its	lessons,	Manchester:	University	Press.	
Solomons	D.	(1991a)	Accounting	and	social	change:	A	neutralist	view.	Accounting,	Organizations	and	
Society	16:	287-295.	DOI:	10.1016/0361-3682(91)90005-Y.	
Solomons	D.	(1991b)	A	rejoinder.	Accounting,	Organizations	and	Society	16:	311-312.	DOI:	
10.1016/0361-3682(91)90007-2.	
Stubbs	P	and	Soroya	B.	(1996)	War	trauma,	psycho-social	projects	and	social	development	in	Croatia.	
Medicine,	Conflict	and	Survival	12:	303-314.	DOI:	10.1080/13623699608409300.	
Sumner	C.	(1996)	Violence,	culture	and	censure.	London:	Taylor	&	Francis.	
	19	
	
Tinker	AM.	(1991)	The	accountant	as	partisan.	Accounting,	Organizations	and	Society	16:	297-310.	
DOI:	10.1016/0361-3682(91)90006-Z.	
Tinker	AM	and	Ghicas	D.	(1993)	Dishonored	contracts:	Accounting	and	the	expropriation	of	
employee	pension	wealth.	Accounting,	Organizations	and	Society	18:	361-380.	DOI:	
10.1016/0361-3682(93)90021-W.	
United	Kingdom,	House	of	Commons.	(1914)	Debate	London:	His	Majesty's	Stationery	Office.	
United	Kingdom,	House	of	Commons.	(1915)	Debate	London:	His	Majesty's	Stationery	Office.	
United	Kingdom,	House	of	Commons.	(1917)	Speech	by	Mr	Pringle,	London:	His	Majesty's	Stationery	
Office.	
United	Kingdom,	House	of	Commons.	(1918)	Debate	on	mavy	and	military	pensions	and	grants,	
London:	His	Majesty's	Stationery	Office.	
United	Kingdom,	House	of	Commons.	(1920)	Debate	London:	His	Majesty's	Stationery	Office.	
United	Kingdom,	House	of	Commons.	(1922a)	Debate	London:	His	Majesty's	Stationery	Office.	
United	Kingdom,	House	of	Commons.	(1922b)	Debate	London:	His	Majesty's	Stationery	Office.	
United	Kingdom,	House	of	Commons.	(1923a)	Debate		between	Mr	C.	Richardson	and	Major	Tryon,	
London:	His	Majesty's	Stationery	Office.	
United	Kingdom,	House	of	Commons.	(1923b)	Speech	by	Mr	Frederick	Roberts	on	War	Pensions	Acts	
(Amendment),	London:	His	Majesty's	Stationery	Office.	
United	Kingdom,	House	of	Commons.	(1940)	Debate	London:	His	Majesty's	Stationery	Office.	
van	Bergen	L.	(2009)	Before	my	helpless	sight:	Suffering,	dying,	and	military	medicine	on	the	Western	
Front,	1914-1918,	Farnham:	Ashgate	Publishing.	
War	Office	Committee	of	Inquiry	into	Shell	Shock.	(1922)	Report	of	the	War	Office	enquiry	into	"shell	
shock".	London:	His	Majesty's	Stationery	Office.	
Weaver	RK.	(1986)	The	politics	of	blame	avoidance.	Journal	of	public	policy	6:	371-398.	DOI:	
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0143814X00004219.	
Webb	TE.	(2006)	‘Dottyville’—Craiglockhart	War	Hospital	and	shell-shock	treatment	in	the	First	
World	War.	Journal	of	the	Royal	Society	of	Medicine	99:	342-346.	DOI:	
http://jrs.sagepub.com/content/99/7/342.short.	
Wessely	S	and	Deahl	M.	(2003)	Psychological	debriefing	is	a	waste	of	time.	The	British	Journal	of	
Psychiatry	183:	12-14.	DOI:	10.1192/bjp.183.1.12.	
Williams	PF.	(2002)	Accounting	and	the	moral	order:	Justice,	accounting,	and	legitmate	moral	
authority.	Accounting	and	the	Public	Interest	2:	1-21.	DOI:	
http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/api.2002.2.1.1.	
	
	
1
	Extract	from	Mental	Cases	by	Wilfred	Owen.		Owen	served	in	the	British	Army	during	the	First	World	War.		
He	was	hospitalised	with	shell	shock.		Mental	Cases,	originally	titled	The	Deranged	and	written	in	1918,	is	part	
description	and	part	propaganda	document	on	the	horror	of	shell	shock.	
																																																																		
